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SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-GIFT BY WILL.
Few doctrines of the Court of Equity are more useful than that
which prevents persons, standing in certain fiduciary relations
towards others, from obtaining, by means of the influence arising
from their position, any undue advantage for themselves. The
application of this doctrine to the relation existing between solicitor
and client we have always thought extremely beneficial, and founded
upon principles incontrovertibly just. A strange anomaly, however,
seems to have been introduced by a recent decision upon this subject;
for although it is clear that a gift inter vivos from a client to his
attorney may be set aside upon the presumption of undue influence,
a gift to the attorney by will, even though he may have drawn it in
his own favor, will, in the absence of the proof of fraud or undue
influence, be supported. The proposition with regard to a gift inter
vivos is supported by the case of Tom8on vs. Judge, 3 Drew. 306.1
There a client conveyed real property to the defendant, his solicitor,
by a deed which purported to be a conveyance, in consideration of
1001., -which was duly acknowledged in the body of the deed to have
been received, and there was the usual receipt endorsed on the deed.
The sum of 1001. never was in reality paid, nor was the conveyance
intended to be a sale, but a gift "for his services, and out of friendship." The value of the property was admitted to be at least 12001.
' Consult Hill on Trustees, p. 160 Am. Ed's. note 3rd Ed. 1857.-Eds. Am. L. Beg.
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Sir R. T. Kindersley, V. C., after an elaborate examination of the
authorities, came to the conclusion that the transaction could not
stand, observing, "I am of opinion, that, according to the rule of
this court, a solicitor cannot, while the relation subsists-while, to
use the language of lord Thurlow, the 'client is or may be under
the crushing influence of the solicitor'-by way of gift, take a
benefit." The learned judge was also of opinion, that A fortiori the
transaction was bad, as the solicitor who took a benefit therefrom
had misstated in the instrument the circumstances under which it
took place. But his honor also most positively and clearly stated,
that "even if the deed had been in consideration of obligations by
the client to the solicitor, or in consideration of a desire to benefit
him, and the deed had been expressly and clearly stated to be for
those considerations, it could not stand."
The doctrines laid down in Tomson vs. Judge, were in the case of
Rindson vs. Weatherill, 5 De G. Mfac., & G. 801, held to be inapplicable to gifts by will. In that case a solicitor, by the directions
of his client, prepared a will, by which a gift inter vivos of a promissory note from the client to the solicitor was confirmed, and a
devise also made to him of an interest in real estate. It was held
by the lords justices of the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision
of Sir J. Stuart, V. C., 1 Sm. & G. 604, that the circumstance of
the solicitor preparing for his client a will containing dispositions
in his own favor did not of itself take away the right of the solicitor
-to be, for his own benefit, a devisee or legatee. The decision might
-have been more satisfactory if the learned judges of the appellate
court had given better reasons for arriving at such a conclusion.
Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, L. J., however, with reference to the cases
which had been cited to the court, showing that gifts inter vivos to
solicitors from their clients were void, merely says, "as to the
-authorities cited, they seem to me all consistent with a conclusion
in the defendant's favor, it being impossible that a testamentary
.gift by a client to a solicitor can, against the latter, be liable to all
the same considerations as a gift to him inter vives would have been
though it may be open to some of them."
Now, with great deference to the learned judge, we think it is a
.Sallapy.to assume, that because all the same considerations which
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apply to a gift from a client to his solicitor by a deed inter vivos
may not or do not apply to a testamentary gift to him, the principles
according to which such transactions are set aside in one case should
not apply in the other. The real question is, not whether all, but
whether the material considerations are equally, or to a sufficient
degree, applicable in both cases; for if we refuse to follow a clear
and well-defined principle in one case, merely because it differs in,
some respects or particulars from another in which it has been acted
upon, our laws would soon be made up of arbitrary rules and startling anomalies.
Now, the principle upon which the court acts in setting aside gifts
inter vivos from clients to solicitors has been stated by lord Eldonan authority to whom most persons in questions of equity jurisprudence are willing to defer-to be "the danger from the influence
of attornies over their clients while having the care of their property;
and whatever mischief may arise in particular cases, the law,
with a view of preventing public mischief, says they shall take no
benefit derived under such circumstances." See
vs. Downes,
18 Yes. 127. Now, the "public mischief" is surely in both cases
the same; the "crushing influence" may be used in the case of a
will, as well as in the case of a deed. Indeed, as wills are often
made when persons are drawing near the end of life, and do not'take
effect until death, it appears to us that if the doctrine which applies
to donations inter vivos be right, (as we doubt not that it is,)
fortiori should it be applied in the case of gifts by will, in making
which persons are often more liable to be affected by undue influence,
not only from the weakening of the mental powers towards tthe close
of life, but also because they generally estimate at little or no value
property which they cannot themselves any longer enjoy. It is
true that a will is revocable at law, which ordinary deeds are not;
but it is difficult to see why this should afford any material distinction between the two cases; for assuming a person to have made a
will under undue influence, be it express or implied, his not having
revoked the will (in which event only the aid of a Court of Equity
would be required) shows that the effect of the influence remained
the same until the last. Sir G. J. Turner, Li. J., who concurred in
the.conclusion to which Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, L. J., had arrived,
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thought that there "was obviously a great distinction between the
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery as applied to contracts and
as applied to testamentary dispositions." "For," he added, "in
the case of a written contract, the court can direct the instrument
to be delivered up to be cancelled, but it has no such jurisdiction
with respect to a will." Now, this objection appears one of a purely
mechanical character, because, although the court of equity has no
jurisdiction to cancel a will, it can attain the same end by fixing a
trust upon a devise unduly obtained in a will, as was done upon the
interest which a professional adviser took as executor in the case of
Segrave vs. Airwan, 1 Beat. 157, the authority of which, although
apparently doubted by Sir G. J. Turner, L. J., was fully recognized
by Lord Eldon in the house of lords when delivering his judgment
in the important case of Bulkley vs. Miforcl.
It is true that Sir G. J. Turner, L. J., says that the case of
Segrave vs. Kirwan, 1 Beat. 157, is clearly distinguishable from
Rindson vs. Weat1zerill. But still the question is, whether the
distinction is material. His Lordship says, "in Segrave vs. irWan
the testator had no intention to benefit Kirwan, the counsel. He
appointed him his executor, but did not know that the effect of the
appointment would be to give him a beneficial interest. He intended
however, to appoint him to be executor, and it may be doubted,
therefore, whether the Ecclesiastical Court could have interfered.
There was in that case no intention of the testator in favor of the legatee. It was not a case in which the testator intended to give a beneficial
interest to Kirwan, for he was ignorant that he had done so."
All that this observation amounts to is merely this-the cases are
so far distinguishable that the equities are different. In Segrave
vs. Kirwan, the equity to hold the executor, who was the counsel
who-drew the will, a'trustee of what he took as executor, was, that
it was his duty to have pointed out to his client that a benefit would
accrue to him from the instrument that he had prepared ; and having
neglected, although from ignorance of the law, to do so, he was
justly deprived of it. In Hindsonvs. Weatherill,the equity (assuming it to be such) arose from the attorney taking a gift from his
client during the existence of the relation between them.
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If an equity arose in the latter as well as in the former case, any
difference in their natures, or whether one depended upon the intention of the testator, while the other did not do so, appears to us to
be immaterial; the result in both cases should be the same.
Sir G. J. Turner, L. J., expressed some alarm at the consequences
of the doctrine contended for by the plaintiff; observing that it was
obvious that "if such a doctrine could be applied to the relation of
solicitor and client, it must be to that of guardian and ward." Now,
we must confess that we should feel no alarm at such an extension
of the doctrine, for however deserving the conduct of a guardian
may have been, if he, before the connexion between himself and his
ward whs completely broken off, drew up a will in his own favor,
though from the instructions of his ward, it would, we conceive, but
be consistent with sound public policy that such a gift by will should
be set aside, as it would undoubtedly be set aside if it were by deed.
It is to be regretted, that upon the appeal the reasons given by
Sir J. Stuart, V. C., in his very able judgment in the court below,
were not more fully discussed. The decision of the Court of Appeals,
though apparently anomalous, may nevertheless be right, unsupported though it be by reasoning such as carries conviction to ordinary minds.
Solicitors are not, in general, underpaid for the performance of
their professional duties; and even if occasional hardship may occur,
by laying down as a general rule that a solicitor shall not, by a will
drawn by himself, take any benefit from his client during the coninuance of the relation bstween them, it would, on the whole, be a
rule which would operate most beneficially, and, in the words of Sir
G. J. Turner, L. J., "check dealings of this kind between solicitor
and c]ient"-dealings which we fear, though much to be reprobated,
are far from unfrequent. Undue influence in the case of wills, as
in the case of deeds, should, with regard to gifts between such persons, be presumed, not because in all instances the presumption
would be correct, but because, in the majority of instances in which
undue influence doubtlessly exists, it would be almost impossible
to substantiate it by proof.'
I London Jurist.

